Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - TPM core and driver updates/fixes
   - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
   - Lots of Apparmor fixes
   - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
     syscall #"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
  apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
  tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
  tpm: Factor out common startup code
  tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
  tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
  tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
  tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
  tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
  apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
  apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
  apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
  apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
  apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
  apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
  apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
  apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
  apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
  apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
  apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
  apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
  ...

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/trivial-devices.txt

@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ national,lm80		Serial Interface ACPI-Compatible Microprocessor System Hardware M
 national,lm85		Temperature sensor with integrated fan control
 national,lm92		±0.33°C Accurate, 12-Bit + Sign Temperature Sensor and Thermal Window Comparator with Two-Wire Interface
 nuvoton,npct501		i2c trusted platform module (TPM)
+nuvoton,npct601		i2c trusted platform module (TPM2)
 nxp,pca9556		Octal SMBus and I2C registered interface
 nxp,pca9557		8-bit I2C-bus and SMBus I/O port with reset
 nxp,pcf8563		Real-time clock/calendar

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.txt

+Required properties:
+- compatible: should be one of the following
+    "st,st33htpm-spi"
+    "infineon,slb9670"
+    "tcg,tpm_tis-spi"
+- spi-max-frequency: Maximum SPI frequency (depends on TPMs).
+
+Optional SoC Specific Properties:
+- pinctrl-names: Contains only one value - "default".
+- pintctrl-0: Specifies the pin control groups used for this controller.
+
+Example (for ARM-based BeagleBoard xM with TPM_TIS on SPI4):
+
+&mcspi4 {
+
+        status = "okay";
+
+        tpm_tis@0 {
+
+                compatible = "tcg,tpm_tis-spi";
+
+                spi-max-frequency = <10000000>;
+        };
+};

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/vendor-prefixes.txt

@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ idt	Integrated Device Technologies, Inc.
 ifi	Ingenieurburo Fur Ic-Technologie (I/F/I)
 iom	Iomega Corporation
 img	Imagination Technologies Ltd.
+infineon Infineon Technologies
 inforce	Inforce Computing
 ingenic	Ingenic Semiconductor
 innolux	Innolux Corporation
@@ -255,6 +256,7 @@ syna	Synaptics Inc.
 synology	Synology, Inc.
 SUNW	Sun Microsystems, Inc
 tbs	TBS Technologies
+tcg	Trusted Computing Group
 tcl	Toby Churchill Ltd.
 technexion	TechNexion
 technologic	Technologic Systems

Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt

@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ Code  Seq#(hex)	Include File		Comments
 					<mailto:buk@buks.ipn.de>
 0xA0	all	linux/sdp/sdp.h		Industrial Device Project
 					<mailto:kenji@bitgate.com>
+0xA1	0	linux/vtpm_proxy.h	TPM Emulator Proxy Driver
 0xA2	00-0F	arch/tile/include/asm/hardwall.h
 0xA3	80-8F	Port ACL		in development:
 					<mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>

Documentation/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.txt

+Virtual TPM Proxy Driver for Linux Containers
+
+Authors: Stefan Berger (IBM)
+
+This document describes the virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM)
+proxy device driver for Linux containers.
+
+INTRODUCTION
+------------
+
+The goal of this work is to provide TPM functionality to each Linux
+container. This allows programs to interact with a TPM in a container
+the same way they interact with a TPM on the physical system. Each
+container gets its own unique, emulated, software TPM.
+
+
+DESIGN
+------
+
+To make an emulated software TPM available to each container, the container
+management stack needs to create a device pair consisting of a client TPM
+character device /dev/tpmX (with X=0,1,2...) and a 'server side' file
+descriptor. The former is moved into the container by creating a character
+device with the appropriate major and minor numbers while the file descriptor
+is passed to the TPM emulator. Software inside the container can then send
+TPM commands using the character device and the emulator will receive the
+commands via the file descriptor and use it for sending back responses.
+
+To support this, the virtual TPM proxy driver provides a device /dev/vtpmx
+that is used to create device pairs using an ioctl. The ioctl takes as
+an input flags for configuring the device. The flags  for example indicate
+whether TPM 1.2 or TPM 2 functionality is supported by the TPM emulator.
+The result of the ioctl are the file descriptor for the 'server side'
+as well as the major and minor numbers of the character device that was created.
+Besides that the number of the TPM character device is return. If for
+example /dev/tpm10 was created, the number (dev_num) 10 is returned.
+
+The following is the data structure of the TPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV ioctl:
+
+struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev {
+	__u32 flags;         /* input */
+	__u32 tpm_num;       /* output */
+	__u32 fd;            /* output */
+	__u32 major;         /* output */
+	__u32 minor;         /* output */
+};
+
+Note that if unsupported flags are passed to the device driver, the ioctl will
+fail and errno will be set to EOPNOTSUPP. Similarly, if an unsupported ioctl is
+called on the device driver, the ioctl will fail and errno will be set to
+ENOTTY.
+
+See /usr/include/linux/vtpm_proxy.h for definitions related to the public interface
+of this vTPM device driver.
+
+Once the device has been created, the driver will immediately try to talk
+to the TPM. All commands from the driver can be read from the file descriptor
+returned by the ioctl. The commands should be responded to immediately.
+
+Depending on the version of TPM the following commands will be sent by the
+driver:
+
+- TPM 1.2:
+  - the driver will send a TPM_Startup command to the TPM emulator
+  - the driver will send commands to read the command durations and
+    interface timeouts from the TPM emulator
+- TPM 2:
+  - the driver will send a TPM2_Startup command to the TPM emulator
+
+The TPM device /dev/tpmX will only appear if all of the relevant commands
+were responded to properly.

MAINTAINERS

@@ -2837,7 +2837,7 @@ F:	include/uapi/linux/can/error.h
 F:	include/uapi/linux/can/netlink.h
 
 CAPABILITIES
-M:	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
+M:	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 F:	include/linux/capability.h
@@ -10675,7 +10675,7 @@ SMACK SECURITY MODULE
 M:	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
 L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 W:	http://schaufler-ca.com
-T:	git git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
+T:	git git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
 S:	Maintained
 F:	Documentation/security/Smack.txt
 F:	security/smack/

arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -932,18 +932,19 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
 {
 	current_thread_info()->syscall = scno;
 
-	/* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
+		tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
+
+	/* Do seccomp after ptrace; syscall may have changed. */
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
 		return -1;
 #else
 	/* XXX: remove this once OABI gets fixed */
-	secure_computing_strict(scno);
+	secure_computing_strict(current_thread_info()->syscall);
 #endif
 
-	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
-		tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
-
+	/* Tracer or seccomp may have changed syscall. */
 	scno = current_thread_info()->syscall;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))

arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -1347,13 +1347,13 @@ static void tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	/* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
-		return -1;
-
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
 		tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
 
+	/* Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->syscallno);
 

arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -888,17 +888,16 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
  */
 asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall)
 {
-	long ret = 0;
 	user_exit();
 
 	current_thread_info()->syscall = syscall;
 
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
-		return -1;
-
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
 	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-		ret = -1;
+		return -1;
+
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
 
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[2]);

arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -311,10 +311,6 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
 
 long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	/* Do the secure computing check first. */
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
-		return -1;
-
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
 	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
 		/*
@@ -325,6 +321,11 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		regs->gr[20] = -1UL;
 		goto out;
 	}
+
+	/* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gr[20]);

arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -1783,12 +1783,12 @@ static int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	 * have already loaded -ENOSYS into r3, or seccomp has put
 	 * something else in r3 (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
 	 */
-	if (__secure_computing())
+	if (__secure_computing(NULL))
 		return -1;
 
 	/*
 	 * The syscall was allowed by seccomp, restore the register
-	 * state to what ptrace and audit expect.
+	 * state to what audit expects.
 	 * Note that we use orig_gpr3, which means a seccomp tracer can
 	 * modify the first syscall parameter (in orig_gpr3) and also
 	 * allow the syscall to proceed.
@@ -1822,22 +1822,25 @@ static inline int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs) { return 0; }
  */
 long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	bool abort = false;
-
 	user_exit();
 
+	/*
+	 * The tracer may decide to abort the syscall, if so tracehook
+	 * will return !0. Note that the tracer may also just change
+	 * regs->gpr[0] to an invalid syscall number, that is handled
+	 * below on the exit path.
+	 */
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+		goto skip;
+
+	/* Run seccomp after ptrace; allow it to set gpr[3]. */
 	if (do_seccomp(regs))
 		return -1;
 
-	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) {
-		/*
-		 * The tracer may decide to abort the syscall, if so tracehook
-		 * will return !0. Note that the tracer may also just change
-		 * regs->gpr[0] to an invalid syscall number, that is handled
-		 * below on the exit path.
-		 */
-		abort = tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs) != 0;
-	}
+	/* Avoid trace and audit when syscall is invalid. */
+	if (regs->gpr[0] >= NR_syscalls)
+		goto skip;
 
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gpr[0]);
@@ -1854,17 +1857,16 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 				    regs->gpr[5] & 0xffffffff,
 				    regs->gpr[6] & 0xffffffff);
 
-	if (abort || regs->gpr[0] >= NR_syscalls) {
-		/*
-		 * If we are aborting explicitly, or if the syscall number is
-		 * now invalid, set the return value to -ENOSYS.
-		 */
-		regs->gpr[3] = -ENOSYS;
-		return -1;
-	}
-
 	/* Return the possibly modified but valid syscall number */
 	return regs->gpr[0];
+
+skip:
+	/*
+	 * If we are aborting explicitly, or if the syscall number is
+	 * now invalid, set the return value to -ENOSYS.
+	 */
+	regs->gpr[3] = -ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
 }
 
 void do_syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)

arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -821,15 +821,6 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
 
 asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	long ret = 0;
-
-	/* Do the secure computing check first. */
-	if (secure_computing()) {
-		/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
-		ret = -1;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * The sysc_tracesys code in entry.S stored the system
 	 * call number to gprs[2].
@@ -843,7 +834,13 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		 * the system call and the system call restart handling.
 		 */
 		clear_pt_regs_flag(regs, PIF_SYSCALL);
-		ret = -1;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
+	if (secure_computing(NULL)) {
+		/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
+		return -1;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
@@ -852,8 +849,8 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	audit_syscall_entry(regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2,
 			    regs->gprs[3], regs->gprs[4],
 			    regs->gprs[5]);
-out:
-	return ret ?: regs->gprs[2];
+
+	return regs->gprs[2];
 }
 
 asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)

arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+		regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 		return -1;
-
-	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) {
-		if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-			regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
 	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]);
 

arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c

@@ -20,12 +20,12 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r)
 	UPT_SYSCALL_NR(r) = PT_SYSCALL_NR(r->gp);
 	PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs, -ENOSYS);
 
-	/* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (syscall_trace_enter(regs))
 		return;
 
-	if (syscall_trace_enter(regs))
-		goto out;
+	/* Do the seccomp check after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return;
 
 	/* Update the syscall number after orig_ax has potentially been updated
 	 * with ptrace.
@@ -37,6 +37,5 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r)
 		PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs,
 				EXECUTE_SYSCALL(syscall, regs));
 
-out:
 	syscall_trace_leave(regs);
 }

arch/x86/entry/common.c

@@ -64,22 +64,16 @@ static void do_audit_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
 }
 
 /*
- * We can return 0 to resume the syscall or anything else to go to phase
- * 2.  If we resume the syscall, we need to put something appropriate in
- * regs->orig_ax.
- *
- * NB: We don't have full pt_regs here, but regs->orig_ax and regs->ax
- * are fully functional.
- *
- * For phase 2's benefit, our return value is:
- * 0:			resume the syscall
- * 1:			go to phase 2; no seccomp phase 2 needed
- * anything else:	go to phase 2; pass return value to seccomp
+ * Returns the syscall nr to run (which should match regs->orig_ax) or -1
+ * to skip the syscall.
  */
-unsigned long syscall_trace_enter_phase1(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
+static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	u32 arch = in_ia32_syscall() ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
+
 	struct thread_info *ti = pt_regs_to_thread_info(regs);
 	unsigned long ret = 0;
+	bool emulated = false;
 	u32 work;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY))
@@ -87,11 +81,19 @@ unsigned long syscall_trace_enter_phase1(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
 
 	work = ACCESS_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY;
 
+	if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
+		emulated = true;
+
+	if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+		return -1L;
+
+	if (emulated)
+		return -1L;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 	/*
-	 * Do seccomp first -- it should minimize exposure of other
-	 * code, and keeping seccomp fast is probably more valuable
-	 * than the rest of this.
+	 * Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes.
 	 */
 	if (work & _TIF_SECCOMP) {
 		struct seccomp_data sd;
@@ -118,69 +120,12 @@ unsigned long syscall_trace_enter_phase1(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
 			sd.args[5] = regs->bp;
 		}
 
-		BUILD_BUG_ON(SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK != 0);
-		BUILD_BUG_ON(SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP != 1);
-
-		ret = seccomp_phase1(&sd);
-		if (ret == SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP) {
-			regs->orig_ax = -1;
-			ret = 0;
-		} else if (ret != SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK) {
-			return ret;  /* Go directly to phase 2 */
-		}
-
-		work &= ~_TIF_SECCOMP;
-	}
-#endif
-
-	/* Do our best to finish without phase 2. */
-	if (work == 0)
-		return ret;  /* seccomp and/or nohz only (ret == 0 here) */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-	if (work == _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) {
-		/*
-		 * If there is no more work to be done except auditing,
-		 * then audit in phase 1.  Phase 2 always audits, so, if
-		 * we audit here, then we can't go on to phase 2.
-		 */
-		do_audit_syscall_entry(regs, arch);
-		return 0;
+		ret = __secure_computing(&sd);
+		if (ret == -1)
+			return ret;
 	}
 #endif
 
-	return 1;  /* Something is enabled that we can't handle in phase 1 */
-}
-
-/* Returns the syscall nr to run (which should match regs->orig_ax). */
-long syscall_trace_enter_phase2(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch,
-				unsigned long phase1_result)
-{
-	struct thread_info *ti = pt_regs_to_thread_info(regs);
-	long ret = 0;
-	u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY;
-
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY))
-		BUG_ON(regs != task_pt_regs(current));
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
-	/*
-	 * Call seccomp_phase2 before running the other hooks so that
-	 * they can see any changes made by a seccomp tracer.
-	 */
-	if (phase1_result > 1 && seccomp_phase2(phase1_result)) {
-		/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
-		return -1;
-	}
-#endif
-
-	if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
-		ret = -1L;
-
-	if ((ret || test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
-	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-		ret = -1L;
-
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->orig_ax);
 
@@ -189,17 +134,6 @@ long syscall_trace_enter_phase2(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch,
 	return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
 }
 
-long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	u32 arch = in_ia32_syscall() ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
-	unsigned long phase1_result = syscall_trace_enter_phase1(regs, arch);
-
-	if (phase1_result == 0)
-		return regs->orig_ax;
-	else
-		return syscall_trace_enter_phase2(regs, arch, phase1_result);
-}
-
 #define EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS				\
 	(_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE |	\
 	 _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)

arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 	 */
 	regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
 	regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
-	tmp = secure_computing();
+	tmp = secure_computing(NULL);
 	if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
 		warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
 				  "seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");

arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h

@@ -83,12 +83,6 @@ extern void send_sigtrap(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
 			 int error_code, int si_code);
 
 
-extern unsigned long syscall_trace_enter_phase1(struct pt_regs *, u32 arch);
-extern long syscall_trace_enter_phase2(struct pt_regs *, u32 arch,
-				       unsigned long phase1_result);
-
-extern long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *);
-
 static inline unsigned long regs_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	return regs->ax;

drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig

@@ -24,9 +24,16 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM
 
 if TCG_TPM
 
+config TCG_TIS_CORE
+	tristate
+	---help---
+	TCG TIS TPM core driver. It implements the TPM TCG TIS logic and hooks
+	into the TPM kernel APIs. Physical layers will register against it.
+
 config TCG_TIS
 	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface / TPM 2.0 FIFO Interface"
 	depends on X86
+	select TCG_TIS_CORE
 	---help---
 	  If you have a TPM security chip that is compliant with the
 	  TCG TIS 1.2 TPM specification (TPM1.2) or the TCG PTP FIFO
@@ -34,6 +41,18 @@ config TCG_TIS
 	  within Linux. To compile this driver as a module, choose  M here;
 	  the module will be called tpm_tis.
 
+config TCG_TIS_SPI
+	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.3 Interface / TPM 2.0 FIFO Interface - (SPI)"
+	depends on SPI
+	select TCG_TIS_CORE
+	---help---
+	  If you have a TPM security chip which is connected to a regular,
+	  non-tcg SPI master (i.e. most embedded platforms) that is compliant with the
+	  TCG TIS 1.3 TPM specification (TPM1.2) or the TCG PTP FIFO
+	  specification (TPM2.0) say Yes and it will be accessible from
+	  within Linux. To compile this driver as a module, choose  M here;
+	  the module will be called tpm_tis_spi.
+
 config TCG_TIS_I2C_ATMEL
 	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface (I2C - Atmel)"
 	depends on I2C
@@ -122,5 +141,16 @@ config TCG_CRB
 	  from within Linux.  To compile this driver as a module, choose
 	  M here; the module will be called tpm_crb.
 
+config TCG_VTPM_PROXY
+	tristate "VTPM Proxy Interface"
+	depends on TCG_TPM
+	select ANON_INODES
+	---help---
+	  This driver proxies for an emulated TPM (vTPM) running in userspace.
+	  A device /dev/vtpmx is provided that creates a device pair
+	  /dev/vtpmX and a server-side file descriptor on which the vTPM
+	  can receive commands.
+
+
 source "drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig"
 endif # TCG_TPM

drivers/char/tpm/Makefile

@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ ifdef CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM
 	tpm-y += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_of.o
 endif
 endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS) += tpm_tis.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_SPI) += tpm_tis_spi.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_ATMEL) += tpm_i2c_atmel.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON) += tpm_i2c_infineon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_NUVOTON) += tpm_i2c_nuvoton.o
@@ -23,3 +25,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM) += tpm_ibmvtpm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24) += st33zp24/
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_XEN) += xen-tpmfront.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_CRB) += tpm_crb.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_VTPM_PROXY) += tpm_vtpm_proxy.o

drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig

 config TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24
-	tristate "STMicroelectronics TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface"
-	depends on GPIOLIB || COMPILE_TEST
+	tristate
 	---help---
 	  STMicroelectronics ST33ZP24 core driver. It implements the core
 	  TPM1.2 logic and hooks into the TPM kernel APIs. Physical layers will
@@ -10,9 +9,9 @@ config TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24
 	  tpm_st33zp24.
 
 config TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_I2C
-	tristate "TPM 1.2 ST33ZP24 I2C support"
-	depends on TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24
+	tristate "STMicroelectronics TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface (I2C)"
 	depends on I2C
+	select TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24
 	---help---
 	  This module adds support for the STMicroelectronics TPM security chip
 	  ST33ZP24 with i2c interface.
@@ -20,9 +19,9 @@ config TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_I2C
 	  called tpm_st33zp24_i2c.
 
 config TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_SPI
-	tristate "TPM 1.2 ST33ZP24 SPI support"
-	depends on TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24
+	tristate "STMicroelectronics TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface (SPI)"
 	depends on SPI
+	select TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24
 	---help---
 	  This module adds support for the STMicroelectronics TPM security chip
 	  ST33ZP24 with spi interface.